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风险投资对被投资企业绩效具有积极影响。基于风险投资与公司治理理论,提出风险投资对创业企业治理结构及风险投资通过公司治理对创业板上市公司业绩影响等研究假设,运用我国创业板上市公司数据进行实证分析。结果表明,风险投资能够显著提高创业板上市公司业绩;风险投资机构介入公司治理可以增强对管理层的激励,从而对创业企业绩效产生显著影响;风险投资对创业企业公司治理水平的直接影响不显著。政府应规范风险投资行业标准,管控投机行为;创业企业要充分利用风险投资机构的优势资源,加强内部监控机制和重视对管理层的激励;风险投资机构应加强自身建设,抵制短期行为,加强合作互鉴,提高服务能力和风险控制能力等。
Abstract：Venture capital plays an important role in promoting the value of the invested enterprises. Based on the data of listed companies on the GEM, this paper explores the impact of venture capital on the governance structure of start-up enterprises and the performance of listed companies on the GEM through corporate governance. It puts forward hypotheses and makes a regression analysis. The results show that venture capital can significantly improve the performance of GEM listed companies; Venture capital institutions' involvement in corporate governance can enhance the incentives to management, thus having a significant impact on the performance of GEM listed companies; The direct impact of venture capital on the corporate governance of GEM is not significant. In order to further enhance the role of venture capital in promoting the value of venture enterprises, countermeasures and suggestions are put forward from the perspective of government, venture capital institutions and invested enterprises.
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基本信息:
DOI：10.13790/j.ncwu.sk.2019.063
中图分类号:F279.2;F832.48
引用信息:
[1]杨艳萍,王明钰.风险投资对创业企业绩效的影响[J].华北水利水电大学学报(社会科学版),2019,35(04):14-24.DOI:10.13790/j.ncwu.sk.2019.063.
基金信息:
国家社会科学基金项目(16BGL026)
2019-08-14
2019-08-14